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Abstract
In a hostile network environment, users must communicate without being detected. This involves blending in with the
existing traffic. In some cases, a higher degree of secrecy is required. We present a proof-of-concept format transforming
encryption (FTE)-based covert channel for tunneling TCP traffic through protected static protocols. Protected static
protocols are UDP-based protocols with variable fields that cannot be blocked without collateral damage, such as power
grid failures. We (1) convert TCP traffic to UDP traffic, (2) introduce observation-based FTE, and (3) model interpacket
timing with a deterministic Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The resulting Protocol Proxy has a very low probability
of detection and is an alternative to current covert channels. We tunnel a TCP session through a UDP protocol and
guarantee delivery. Observation-based FTE ensures traffic cannot be detected by traditional rule-based analysis or DPI.
A deterministic HMM ensures the Protocol Proxy accurately models interpacket timing to avoid detection by side-
channel analysis. Finally, the choice of a protected static protocol foils stateful protocol analysis and causes collateral
damage with false positives.
Keywords: Covert Channel, Format Transforming Encryption (FTE), Steganography, Traffic Analysis, Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI), Pluggable Transport (PT), Deterministic Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Synchrophasor
1. Introduction
Traffic analysis classifies network traffic using observ-
able information. Network engineers use traffic analysis
to ensure quality of service and identify threats. As a re-
sult, the development of hardware and software tools that
quickly and effectively classify traffic has been encouraged.
Commercial traffic analysis tools are used by governments
to block access to websites that counter their current nar-
rative [1]. Tools for countering traffic analysis have been
developed for both criminal use and covert channels.
Tor is a popular overlay network that routes traffic
through three randomly chosen nodes on the Internet. Tor
uses nested encryption to ensure messages cannot be in-
tercepted. The client encrypts packets. Each relay node
decrypts the outermost layer, revealing another encrypted
layer for the next hop to decrypt. By wrapping encryption
(like the layers of an onion), it is possible to encrypt traffic
so each node only knows its neighbors. This is not a silver
bullet. In contested network environments, it is easy to
detect and block Tor [2]. To prevent blocking, pluggable
transports (PTs) were developed to obfuscate Tor’s traffic
patterns.
PT developers must ensure their tools are able to pen-
etrate nation state firewalls while authoritarian govern-
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ments must determine the optimal defense [3]. Some pop-
ular PTs simply wrap encrypted traffic with a new header
to allow TLS traffic to pass through firewalls [4, 5]. At
first, this may seem like an elegant solution, but it is sim-
ple to add another firewall rule to block this traffic. This
is security through obscurity.
Format Transformation Encryption (FTE) is a form of
steganography that translates network traffic into a host
protocol1. Previous FTE implementations used regular ex-
pressions [6] and context free grammars [7]. Padding and
rerouting has obfuscated traffic and removed side-channels
[8]. In previous work, we used FTE and hidden Markov
models (HMMs) to translate traffic flows into DNS re-
quests and responses [9, 10] and smart grid sensor traffic
[11]. Fridrich determined an upper bound on the amount
of information that could be steganographically encoded
in JPEG images before distortions were visually detected
[12]. HMMs have some notable advantages:
1. data windowing of HMMs [13] makes them effective
for both protocol detection and mimicry,
2. tools for differentiating HMMs are well defined [13],
and
3. a normalized metric space can directly measure the
quality of protocol mimicry [14].
1The host protocol refers to the protocol being mimicked
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We propose security through collateral damage. Cer-
tain protocols are more expensive to block than others.
Usually, blocking the wrong TLS stream has little collat-
eral damage other than disgruntled users.
We chose Synchrophasor traffic for our FTE implemen-
tation, but another example is Network Time Protocol
(NTP) traffic. We use Synchrophasor traffic because we
have access to Clemson’s Real-Time Power and Intelligent
System (RTPIS) Laboratory [15] and real Synchrophasor
traffic.2 To accomplish this transformation, we made the
following novel contributions:
1. An architecture to tunnel TCP traffic through UDP
traffic.
2. Real-time observation-based format transforming en-
cryption (FTE) [11].
3. A theoretical upper bound on the channel capacity
of observation-based FTE.
4. Emulating the packet timing of a host protocol.
5. A proxy capable of tunneling SSH (TCP) through
power-grid Synchrophasor traffic (UDP) in a statis-
tically indistinguishable manner.
In Section 2, we introduce related work. In Section 3,
we justify observation-based FTE as a undetectable com-
munication channel. In Section 4, we provide the mathe-
matical background behind deterministic HMMs. In Sec-
tion 5, we provide the system architecture and justify our
design decisions. Figure 1 shows our high-level system
architecture: Section 5.1 describes observation-based for-
mat transforming encryption using our novel method. Sec-
tion 5.2 describes massaging packet timing with a deter-
ministic HMM inferred using the method described in Sec-
tion 4.1, and Section 5.3 describes how everything fits the
overall Protocol Proxy architecture. Section 6 provides
the experimental setup, and Section 7 details our results.
Finally, we provide our closing thoughts and future work
in Section 8.
2. Related Work
Creating covert online communication tools has been
the focus of many privacy advocacy groups. Since the
data in covert channels is encrypted, the goal is to balance
probability of detection with throughput based on the de-
sired application [16]. Timing side-channels are used when
low probability of detection is prioritized over throughput
[17, 18].
2Synchrophasor traffic is a UDP-based protocol generated by Pha-
sor Measurement Units (PMUs) that contains alternating current
phase measurements. This protocol is used to balance the load at
different points in the power grid.
Named Data Networking (NDN) posits an alternative
internet architecture based on content delivery [19]. Con-
sumers express interest in a topic to NDN routers. These
NDN routers check their Content Stores to see if an in-
terest is cached. If the information is not available, the
router adds the interest to a Pending Interest Table and
forwards the interest upstream according to the Forward-
ing Information Base and Forwarding Strategy. Tsudik et.
al proposed an anonymous communication network using
NDN [20]. Cui et al. proposed a model for preventing
censorship using smart NDN routers [21]. Neither of these
solutions addresses the issue of covert communications in
a contested environment.
Ambrosin et. al proposed a method for delay-based
covert communication using cache techniques [22]. Given
a sender and receiver share an NDN router at some point
in the network, the sender and receiver can communicate
using the round trip time (RTT) of the receiver’s interest
requests. The sender and receiver agree on C0 and C1 out-
of-band. The sender requests a certain interest, Cb, and
the receiver receives the message by requesting both C0
and C1. By comparing the RTT of both C0 and C1, it is
possible to determine which interest the sender requested–
Cb will have a shorter RTT since it already exists in the
router’s cache. While this covert channel is interesting,
it would be easy to detect in Iran or China since CCNx
(the NDN implementation) is not widely used. The traffic
would be anomalous in that environment and could be
used to identify users before being blocked [23].
Tor’s [24] anonymity network wraps network traffic in
layers of encryption. Each layer can only be decrypted
by the next hop in the onion network. While it provides
anonymous access to the Internet, the Tor protocol is easy
to detect and block [25, 2]. Undetectable communication
was not one of Tor’s goals, but it spawned the Pluggable
Transport project to address this challenge and encourage
the development of other covert communication tools [26].
Pluggable Transports (PTs) [27] address this concern.
PTs offer a generic way to obfuscate traffic. Shape-shifting
PTs transform traffic into a different protocol. Skype-
Morph [28] makes network traffic resemble a Skype ses-
sion. StegoTorus [29] demultiplexes connections to avoid
traffic analysis and uses steganography to hide informa-
tion in different protocols (including Skype). In The par-
rot is dead: Observing unobservable network communica-
tions, Houmansadr et al. [30] found both approaches fell
short of true protocol mimicry. In both cases, handshake
packets were incorrect. Other flaws were noted with Ste-
goTorus’s implementation of HTTP steganography [30].
Censorspoofer mimics the Ekiga VoIP software, but it also
falls short of mimicking protocol intricacies [30].
A number of PTs scramble traffic to remove finger-
prints. Obfs2 [31], Obfs3 [31], Obfs4 [4], and Scramble-
Suite [32] each attempt to remove a network fingerprint
by scrambling the data. Dust2 and its previous version
(Dust) change statistical properties of traffic to bypass
firewalls [5]. With technologies like software defined net-
2
Figure 1: Protocol Proxy architecture with relevant sections indicated.
working (SDN), these statistical PTs will likely be blocked
by adaptive firewalls.
Recent PTs use domain fronting. Traffic is sent to a
benign destination (Google, Amazon, Azure, etc.) and al-
lowed through the firewall because blocking such a large
domain would cause unintended collateral damage. Flash-
Proxy [33], SnowFlake[34], and meek [35] all use variations
of domain fronting. This approach has been successful but
is not condoned by companies whose domains are being
used since it exposes them to potential backlash.
FTE PTs are a subset of shape-shifting PTs that stegano-
graphically encode traffic using values typical of the host
protocol [6]. It is best to use a widely adopted protocol,
such as DHCP [36] or VoIP [37]. Marionette [7] is a shape-
shifting PT that uses a probabilistic context-free grammar
(PCFG) and production rules to mimic the host protocol.
The PCFG ensures traffic is syntactically and semanti-
cally correct and production rules occur at the expected
frequency. Determining the appropriate PCFG to model
a protocol is an open research question [6, 7]. Marionette
ensures interpacket timing, packet size, and session count
mimic the host protocol.
Refraction Networking (TapDance) [38] spoofs the des-
tination IP address. If the packet is routed through a
decoy router, the true destination IP address is substi-
tuted for the spoofed address. Recent work has shown
it may be inexpensive to censor decoy routers [39]. Al-
ternatively, TARN [40] provides an approach that mixes
traffic from different autonomous systems at the software
defined exchange (SDX) level. This provides a high level
of anonymity and is resistant to a malicious ISP or BGP in-
jection, but it is not realistic for a covert channel. Network-
based moving target defense solutions have also been pro-
posed [1] for covert channels.
GNUnet [41], I2P [42], and Freenet [43] all seek to
provide anonymous access to the Internet. GNUnet is a
toolbox for developing secure decentralized applications,
but widespread censorship is possible [44]. I2P uses garlic
routing (an onion-based routing protocol) to route traffic
securely, but I2P is meant to be a self-contained network.
I2P can be blocked if an adversary controls a small num-
ber of routers in the network and uses traditional IP-based
filtering [45]. I2P routers can be identified because hiding
I2P traffic was not a design goal [46]. Freenet focuses on
using prior knowledge to form connections, and it is pos-
sible to passively (or actively) scan the network for nodes
[47]. It arguably provides more anonymity, but it is re-
source intensive. Many governments block access to these
tools, which makes the first hop important.
Traditional Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are not
usually effective in a contested environment because en-
crypted data can indicate malicious activity [48]. As a
result, Psiphon [49], Lantern [50], and Ultrasurf [51] have
started using PTs. With Lantern, traffic is only forwarded
through the PT if it is likely to be blocked.
Image steganography is also an effective means of covert
communication. Fridrich investigated the relationship be-
tween distortion and information capacity [12]. Unfortu-
nately, the model derived in [12] does not directly apply
to FTE-based covert channels.
2.1. Previous Work
This article extends the work by Zhong et al. in [11]
where network traffic was manipulated offline as a proof-
of-concept. The Protocol Proxy architecture presented in
this work is a novel contribution designed to address the
issues that result from real-time traffic manipulation. The
observation-based FTE algorithm was enhanced from [11]
to increase throughput. In this work, we present a the-
oretical bound on the information that can be encoded
using observation-based FTE. Zhong et al. [11] manipu-
lated packet timing in an offline proof-of-concept by setting
the packet timestamp in the PCAP file. In this work, we
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manipulate packet timing in real-time, which creates addi-
tional challenges that are addressed by the novel Protocol
Proxy architecture. Zhong et al. [11] did not consider
guaranteed delivery for a UDP protocol, which must be
addressed when manipulating TCP traffic in realtime. Fi-
nally, while Zhong et al. [11] used HMMs to manipulate
packet timing, they did not consider the need for formal
model verification.
3. Undetectability
Detecting protocol mimicry can be done in several ways:
rule-based analysis, deep packet inspection (DPI), state-
ful protocol analysis, side-channel analysis, and statistical
analysis. If a packet matches a set of predetermined rules,
then it is accepted (or rejected). Rules typically look only
at the packet headers. They concentrate on IP source, IP
destination, source port, destination port, protocol type
(TCP or UDP), and several other fields. These fields are
available in the packet header without the need for DPI,
so this is the first line of defense for high throughput use
cases. If packets are destined for IP addresses that belong
to a malicious web site, they will be dropped before they
leave their respective autonomous systems. Source and
destination ports are also used to classify traffic [52].
DPI classifies traffic by analyzing the protocol pay-
load. Recent developments allow primitive classification of
HTTPS (encrypted) traffic [53]. It has been shown FTE
can bypass both rule-based analysis and DPI [6, 7].
“Stateful” firewalls avoid certain attacks by only per-
mitting traffic if the traffic obeys the underlying protocol.
For instance, TCP traffic is required to complete the hand-
shake before data packets are allowed through the firewall.
Housmansadr et al. [54] used an extension of this idea to
identify protocol mimicry. By classifying the states of a
host protocol, it is possible to identify poor imitations by
identifying discrepancies between observed and expected
states. Housmansadr et. al used this to find where Skype-
Morph differed from Skype. Once differences were identi-
fied, simple rules can identify SkypeMorph traffic.
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) have been used in
side-channel analysis to identify Synchrophasor traffic in
an encrypted VPN [55]. HMM inference occurs offline,
and it requires a large sample of traffic to build the timing
model of the unidentified protocol. In the future, HMM
detection will likely be performed online.
Statistical analysis is a hybrid approach that attempts
to use statistical properties to identify traffic. Chaos the-
ory is one approach to statistical detection [56]. Entropy
has also been used with distributed denial of service (DDoS)
detection, but entropy can easily be spoofed [57]. We use
statistical analysis to compare the timing models of the
original traffic with the traffic we generated.
Our variation of protocol mimicry uses a protected static
protocol. We use this term to refer to a specific subset of
protocols that are prime candidates for protocol mimicry.
Static protocols are UDP-based and lack application-layer
handshakes (like those in Skype), making them immune
to stateful analysis. The final layer of security is choosing
protocols that are protected. These protocols have high col-
lateral damage for false positives. If Synchrophasor pack-
ets are dropped, it can have adverse consequences for the
power grid.
4. Hidden Markov Models
A Markov model is a tuple G = (S, T, P ) where S is a
set of states of a model, T is a set of directed transitions
between the states, and P = {p(si, sj)} is a probability
matrix associated with transitions from state si to sj such
that: ∑
sj∈S
p(si, sj) = 1,∀si ∈ S (1)
A Markov model satisfies the Markov property, where
the next state only depends on the current state. An HMM
is a Markov model with unobservable states. A standard
HMM [58, 59] has two sets of random processes: one for
state transition and the other for symbol outputs. HMMs
have been used to effectively model time series data [60].
A deterministic HMM [14, 61, 62] is used in this paper,
and it has one random processes for state transitions. Dif-
ferent output symbols are associated with transitions with
different probability. This representations is equivalent to
the standard HMM [63, 14].
4.1. Inferring Deterministic HMMs
Deterministic HMM inference is depicted in Figure 2.
A stream of network packets, Figure 2a, is observed. The
interpacket delay (time between each packet) is calculated,
and the values are plotted in a histogram. This histogram
is grouped into different states, and these states manifest
themselves as peaks in the histogram. In Figure 2b, there
are three peaks. Each peak is given a unique label. The
stream of interpacket delays is re-interpreted using the as-
signed labels. A stream of labels, as shown in Figure 2c, is
used to infer the deterministic HMM shown in Figure 2d.
Each state in the HMM corresponds to a label. The prob-
ability of an ‘a’ output expression in state ‘b’ is given by
the number of occurrences of the string ‘ba’ divided by
the number of occurrences of the string ‘b’. If there were
1000 occurrences of the string ‘b’, and we know the string
‘ba’ occurred 250 times, then 25% of the time we transi-
tioned to state ‘a’. The full process for inferring determin-
istic HMMs is provided in [64, 65]. Given a deterministic
HMM, it is possible to generate a stream of packet timings.
4.2. Comparing Deterministic HMMs
In [14], the authors develop a normalized metric space
for comparing HMMs, and in [66] the authors show a
method for ensuring an inferred HMM is significant. We
use an alternative approach that is tailored to this chal-
lenge. Before determining whether two deterministic HMMs
4
(a) Stream of incoming packets with timing denoted.
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Figure 2: Detailed example of how a deterministic HMM is inferred
from packet timing.
are equal, it is desirable to ensure the probability distri-
bution functions (PDFs) used to generate the HMM are
equal. To do this, we use the two-sample Kolmogornov-
Smirnov (KS) test [67], which tests the null hypothesis
(two sets of samples come from the same underlying distri-
bution) against the alternate hypothesis (two sets of sam-
ples come from different underlying distributions). The KS
statistic is the empirical distribution function Fn, defined
below.
Fn(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(−∞,x](Xi) (2)
Here, n refers to the number of identically indepen-
dently distributed samples (Xi) taken from the sample
space (X). Samples (Xi) are randomly chosen observa-
tions from Figure 2a. The indicator function, I(−∞,x](Xi),
is defined in Equation (3).
I[−∞,x](Xi) =
{
1, Xi < x
0, otherwise
(3)
The two-sample KS test compares the distance be-
tween the two empirical distribution functions using Equa-
tion (4).
Dn,m = sup
x
|F1,n(x)− F2,m(x)| (4)
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% confidence
level if the following criterion is met.
Dn,m > 1.36
√
n+m
nm
(5)
To determine whether two deterministic HMMs are
equivalent, it is sufficient to show all corresponding states
in the deterministic HMM are equivalent. If all states are
equivalent, the HMMs are equivalent. To show two states
of a deterministic HMM are equivalent, we use the χ2
test for homogeneity to test if the probability distributions
for outgoing state transitions are statistically equivalent.
The generic expression for the χ2 statistic for homogene-
ity given P populations and C levels of the categorical
variable is shown below.
χ2 =
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈C
(Oi,j − Ei,j)2
Ei,j
(6)
In this representation, Oi,j is the number of occur-
rences observed in the state corresponding to i and the
output expression corresponding to j. Similarly, Ei,j is
the number of expected occurrences for the combination
of state and output expression. The expected number of
occurrences is calculated as shown below in Equation (7).
Ei,j =
ninj
n
(7)
Here, ni is the number of observations in state i, nj is
the number of observations at that level of the categorical
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variable, and n is the sample size. For threshold testing,
the degrees of freedom (DF ) is given as follows.
DF = (P − 1)(C − 1) (8)
In this work, we compare two states (populations), so
P is 2. Therefore, the DF for any given state is simply
the number of output expressions (C) minus one.
5. Architecture
Converting TCP-based Tor traffic to the UDP Syn-
chrophasor protocol requires a number of building blocks
that were not present in [11]. The TCP packet must be
converted to several Synchrophasor packets. The packet
timing of outgoing packets must be adjusted to model the
timing of Synchrophasor traffic. A transport layer con-
verter is required to tunnel TCP-based protocols through
UDP protocols while still maintaining TCP’s guaranteed
delivery. Finally, these building blocks can be linked to-
gether to provide a proof-of-concept that can convert Tor’s
TCP traffic to UDP Synchrophasor traffic.
5.1. Observation-based FTE
Simply sending UDP packets to a specific port isn’t
enough. Capturing the packet in an analysis tool like
Wireshark [68] will reveal the packet is malformed. While
this rises to the level of existing obfuscation PTs, it does
not solve the problem. Traditional FTE takes the syntax
of a protocol and creates a PCFG to map raw binary data
to that protocol’s syntax [69]. Determining the appropri-
ate PCFG to model a protocol is left as an open research
question, which makes it unrealistic to deploy [6, 7].
We propose observation-based FTE, as an alternative.
We collect a substantial amount of traffic and record the
unique observations for each field in the protocol. If Alice
and Bob want to encode information using observation-
based FTE with the protocol shown in Figure 3, they con-
struct a lookup table with each field and an ordered list of
observations. This lookup table is a shared out-of-band.
High-entropy (encrypted) information can be encoded us-
ing observation-based FTE by construction a packet using
observations from the host protocol. With the protocol in
Figure 3, three bits can be encoded in the first field. When
Alice receives the message and sees ‘observation 5’ in ‘field
1’, she uses the shared lookup table to determine the first
three encoded bits are ‘101’ (the binary value of the obser-
vation’s index). The high-entropy input also ensures each
field (and each packet) is independent of the other fields
(and packets)3.
Zhong et al.’s work [11] used a primitive version of
observation-based FTE that did not consider the upper
bound on the information capacity of an FTE channel.
Figure 3: Example protocol to illustrate observation-based FTE.
Theorem 1. For a given protocol, the maximum amount
of information that can be encoded in a packet using observation-
based FTE is given by:
S =
∑
γi∈Γ
log2(|γi|) (9)
Where Γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γn} is the set of n fields in the pro-
tocol, and |γi| is the number of unique observations in that
field.
Proof. The maximum amount of information that can be
encoded in a particular field using observation-based FTE
is given by the Shannon entropy of that field.
H(γi) = −
∑
x∈γi
p(x)log2(p(x)) (10)
Each stream of n bits is equally likely3. Therefore, the
choice of each observation is equally likely. This simplifies
Equation (11) as follows.
H(γi) = −
∑
x∈γi
1
|γi| log2
(
1
|γi|
)
= −|γi| 1|γi| log2
(
1
|γi|
)
= −log2
(
1
|γi|
)
= log2(|γi|)
(11)
The amount of information that can be encoded in a
single packet is the sum of the information that can be
encoded in each field in the packet.
S =
∑
γi∈Γ
log2(|γi|) (12)
Performing these calculation on the Synchrophasor pro-
tocol yields 516 bits that can be encoded in a single UDP
3Since the data being mapped to the protocol is encrypted using
AES encryption and AES produces a high-entropy bitstream [70], we
can assume 0 and 1 are equally likely in practice.
6
Figure 4: Process for segmenting TCP packets for transmission.
packet. Since this is smaller than the typical TCP packet,
it is necessary to segment TCP packets for transmission.
The optimal average goodput (Gavg) can be calculated
with Equation (13), where S is found using Equation (12),
and Tavg is the average interpacket delay, which is 0.03334
seconds for Synchrophasor traffic. This yields an theoret-
ical average goodput of 15,477 bits per second.
Gavg =
S
Tavg
(13)
Segmentation is shown in Figure 4, where each item
below is indicated in the figure:
1. The original TCP packet is taken.
2. The packet length is prepended to the beginning of
packet as a four byte unsigned integer.
3. The packet is broken into 63 byte chunks, and each
chunk is prepended with a one byte sequence num-
bers for a total of 64 bytes. The sequence number
allows the chunks to be reassembled later into the
original TCP packet. Depending on the size of the
packet, it is possible there will not be enough pay-
load data to fill the final chunk. In this case, random
data is appended to the end.
4. Each 64 byte chunk is encrypted with Electronic
Code Book (ECB) encryption4.
5. The observation-based FTE encodes each 64 byte
(512 bit) chunk into a 516 bit UDP payloads using
the method previously discussed.
5.2. Packet Timing
The HMM timing model described in Section 4 was
given to the Protocol Proxy, which queries the timing
model for a timing value. When the model is queried, it ex-
amines its current state, yields an output expression based
on the probability distribution of the current state, and
chooses a timing value from the output expression group.
The model advances to the chosen state. The Protocol
Proxy waits for the allotted time before sending a packet.
If there are no packets to send, random data is encoded
and sent. These packets are dropped by the server. Send-
ing placeholder packets ensures the correct timing model
is emulated when there are no packets to transmit.
This approach to packet timing differs from the NDN
covert channel proposed in [22]. Our approach does not
convey any information using interpacket delays. Inter-
packet delays can often be an indicator of a covert channel,
so we ensure the timing of the covert channel is statistically
identical to the host protocol.
4ECB is used because packets may arrive out of order, which
makes cipher block chain impractical.
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Figure 5: Architecture for the Protocol Proxy transport converter.
5.3. Protocol Proxy
The Protocol Proxy combines the previous elements to
create a covert channel using the host protocol.
We use Scapy [71]5 to capture TCP packets. These
captured packet includes both the TCP header and pay-
load. Applications using the Protocol Proxy are config-
ured to send traffic to a closed loopback port, and Scapy
sniffs the loopback interface looking for traffic destined
to that port. By default, when a closed port receives a
TCP packet, it responds with a TCP RST (reset) packet.
The RST packet immediately terminates the connection
and ceases all communication with the other host. This
is a low-level response dictated by the host firewall. The
transport converter requires this RST packet not be sent,
so the internal firewall (iptables on Linux) was modified
accordingly. The following command disables RST packets
for all ports on Linux.
1 sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST \
2 RST -j DROP
Listing 1: The iptables command to disable RST packets.
In Figure 5, an application on the client sends a packet
to a closed local port (8001 in our example). Scapy sniffs
the network stack and captures the entire packet. The
Ethernet and IP layers are stripped, and the packet is
transformed into a UDP payload using observation-based
FTE, as described in Section 5.1. After transforming the
packet into the host protocol’s payload, new Ethernet, IP,
and UDP layers are generated so the packet can be sent
across the network to the server. All the UDP packets are
sent to the port that corresponds to the emulated protocol.
The timing of outgoing packets is determined by the HMM
described in Section 5.2.
On the server, the Protocol Proxy listens on the pre-
determined port for the UDP packet. Once it receives
the UDP packet, it takes the UDP payload, reverses the
observation-base FTE transformation described in Section 5.1,
5Scapy is a Python library for packet capture, manipulation, and
injection
and sends it to a Scapy packet injector. The Scapy packet
injector creates new Ethernet and IP layers to make the
packet look like it originated from the local machine. Then,
Scapy injects the new packet into the local network stack,
and it is received by the local application. This provides a
bidirectional covert channel that uses actual observations
from host protocol.
Since the Protocol Proxy is accessed via an open port,
it is trivial to integrate with Tor. Tor natively supports
tunneling outgoing connections through a SOCKS proxy,
so the Tor client is configured to use the Protocol Proxy
port as a SOCKS proxy. On the server, a SOCKS server
listens for traffic forwarded from the Protocol Proxy.
6. Experiment Setup
Over 770,000 samples were collected from the PMUs
in Clemson’s RTPIS Laboratory [15]. These samples were
used to model the timing of the protocol as described in
Section 5.2. All testing was done in Clemson’s security
lab with clean installations of Arch Linux (kernel version
4.17.2-1). The experiment setup is shown in Figure 6. We
used scp to transfer data over the Protocol Proxy to an
SSH server on a remote machine. The Protocol Proxy
server was launched using the following command.
server# protocol proxy server 192.168.10.23 8001
Since the Protocol Proxy requires access to raw sock-
ets, it must be executed by a privileged user. The ‘server’
option tells the Protocol Proxy to expect packets origi-
nating from the specified port (8001). The IP address
(192.168.10.23) is the IP address of the client that will
connect to the server. The next step is to ensure the ker-
nel does not send a reset packet (TCP RST) when packets
are sent to the closed port (8001). This is done by exe-
cuting the iptables command shown in Listing 1. Next,
the SSH server is set to listen to port 8001 for incom-
ing connections in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file. SSH
(OpenSSH 7.7p1) was used for the server. It was nec-
essary to configure a non-standard port to avoid conflict
when forwarding the traffic through the Protocol Proxy.
The client was launched with the following command.
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Figure 6: The Protocol Proxy integrated for use with SCP.
client # protocol proxy client 192.168.10.24 8001
Again, the application must be executed by a privileged
user. The ‘client’ option tells the transport to expect pack-
ets destined for the specified port (8001). The IP address
(192.168.10.24) is the IP address of the host executing the
program. As with the server, the client does not open
the port, so the rules in Listing 1 must be applied to the
client to ensure TCP connections are not prematurely ter-
minated.
A one kilobyte data file was transferred from the client
to the server using scp as shown below.
client # scp -P 8001 file 127.0.0.1: file
The destination port was set to 8001 on the client,
which was the local port being forwarded to the Protocol
Proxy. The traffic between the client to the server was
captured, and another HMM was inferred from this gen-
erated traffic. This second HMM was compared via the
χ2-test to the original HMM used by the Protocol Proxy.
Finally, the baseline goodput was measured by recording
the time required to transfer the 1 kilobyte data file.
7. Results
Figure 7 shows the histogram of interpacket delay times
for the Synchrophasor traffic captured in Clemson’s RT-
PIS laboratory. The output expressions are labeled in the
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Figure 7: Histogram of the interpacket delay of real Synchrophasor
traffic with states labeled.
histogram according to the prominent peaks. Using the
techniques described in Section 4, the deterministic HMM
in Figure 8 was inferred.
With this HMM, it was then possible to generate Syn-
chrophasor traffic with observation-based FTE and accu-
rate timing. Figure 9 shows a Wireshark deconstruction
of the traffic generated with our Protocol Proxy. Wire-
shark correctly identifies the Protocol Proxy traffic as Syn-
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b(0 .485)
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c (0 .041)
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Figure 8: HMM generated from the interpacket delay of Synchropha-
sor traffic.
Figure 9: Wireshark decoding of the Protocol Proxy traffic.
chrophasor traffic and is able to parse the field values
from the payload. The checksum is also correctly calcu-
lated. This FTE-generated PMU traffic is accepted by
the Phasor Data Concentrators–the hardware PMU data-
store [11]. Since packets generated by the Protocol Proxy
only use previously observed field values, the Protocol
Proxy is syntactically equivalent to the host protocol. Any
rule that would detect Protocol Proxy traffic would have
false-positives on legitimate PMU traffic, and these false-
positives would lead to significant collateral damage.
Figure 10 shows the histogram of interpacket delay
times for the generated traffic with the output expressions
labeled. Figure 11 shows the deterministic HMM inferred
from the histogram to model the timing patterns of the
Protocol Proxy traffic. Visually, this model appears al-
most identical to the model used to generate the traffic.
Before determining if the two deterministic HMMs were
equal, the two-sample KS test was applied to the two dis-
tributions (shown in Figure 7 and Figure 10). To apply
this test, we randomly sample each distribution 100 times
and apply the test using the two sets of samples. The p-
value for the two-sample KS test was found to be 0.21, so
with a threshold of 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothe-
sis. The interpacket delay times of the Protocol Proxy are
from the probability distribution as the interpacket delay
times of the original Synchrophasor traffic.
To determine if the two deterministic HMMs were equal,
the HMMs were checked for state-wise equality using the
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Figure 10: Histogram of the interpacket delay of generated Syn-
chrophasor traffic with states labeled.
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Figure 11: HMM generated from the interpacket delay of the gener-
ated Synchrophasor traffic.
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Table 1: State-wise χ2 test for homogeneity comparing HMMs.
State Comparison Inferred-Inferred Generated-Inferred
(p-value) (p-value)
a-a 0.75 0.82
b-b 0.19 0.37
c-c 0.06 0.15
Table 2: Comparison of observed and theoretical goodput through
the Protocol Proxy.
Baseline Theoretical Observed
Goodput 54 Mbps 15,477 bps 182 bps
χ2 test for homogeneity. The p-values for the χ2 test
are shown in Table 1. The first comparison (inferred-
inferred) infers two HMMs using 10,000 samples and a
random starting point in the original traffic. From these
values, we fail to reject the null hypothesis (with an α
value of 0.05) for every state and are left to conclude the
traffic is homogeneous, which means it does not change
over time. The second comparison (generated-inferred)
infers one HMM from the Protocol Proxy traffic and an-
other HMM from the original Synchrophasor traffic. From
these values, we fail to reject the null hypothesis (with an
α value of 0.05) for every state and are left to conclude
the traffic from the Protocol Proxy is equivalent to the
homogeneous Synchrophasor traffic.
The baseline goodput (link speed) was determined to
be 54 Mbps, while the goodput through the PMU Protocol
Proxy was found to be 182.2 bits per second. These values
are compared to the theoretical goodput in Table 2. The
difference between theoretical and observed goodput is at-
tributed to retransmission and packet overhead (the TCP
header is sent through the Protocol Proxy). We measured
the goodput through Tor to be around 7.31 Mbps using
an online speed test6.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
Covert communication techniques must evade several
types of threats: rule-based detection, DPI, stateful proto-
col analysis, side-channel analysis, and statistical analysis.
To address these issues, we presented a novel approach
for tunneling TCP traffic through protected static proto-
cols. Protected protocols have collateral damage associ-
ated with false positives, and static protocols are determin-
istic UDP-based protocols whose pattern never changes.
To accomplish this, we introduced (1) an architecture to
convert TCP traffic to UDP traffic7, (2) observation-based
FTE to mimic the host protocol’s payload, and (3) a de-
terministic HMM to model the host protocol’s interpacket
6https://speedof.me
7The conversion from TCP to UDP is not intended to provide an
additional layer of security. It is necessary because the host protocol
is UDP-based, and it is an open challenge in PT development.
timing. The Wireshark packet capture in Figure 9 illus-
trates objectives (1) and (2)–Protocol Proxy traffic is syn-
tactically equivalent to the host protocol. The χ2 test
shows the timing generated by the Protocol Proxy is sta-
tistically equivalent to the host protocol.
This extends the simulation present in [11] by devel-
oping an architecture to perform the protocol transforma-
tions in real-time. The Protocol Proxy provides a universal
interface for connecting applications. A theoretical upper-
bound for the information capacity of an observation-based
FTE channel was derived, which facilitated the improve-
ment of the previous observation-based FTE implementa-
tion. During testing, it was found some Linux distributions
were incapable of emulating the timing of the host proto-
col. Arch Linux was chosen for its ability to consistently
emulate timing. The cause of this discrepancy is currently
being investigated. The Protocol Proxy does not transmit
information using the interpacket delay as with the NDN-
based covert channel [22], and the presence of NDN traffic
itself could be enough to indicate a covert channel.
Future work will provide an in-depth security analysis
of the Protocol Proxy, decrease the overhead associated
with packet retransmissions, and adapt the Protocol Proxy
to Tor’s PT version 2.0 specification [26]. While the Pro-
tocol Proxy’s goodput was significantly slower than Tor,
the use-case is situations when any anomalous traffic could
have negative repercussions. This trade-off between per-
formance and detection is justified in those cases. We will
also investigate a number of performance improvements.
For instance, the entire TCP packet is currently transmit-
ted through the proxy, but in reality much less data is
required for most packets. The Protocol Proxy approach
may be vulnerable to semantic analysis using probabilis-
tic context-free grammars, but these techniques are not
currently used in the wild for scalability reasons.
The Protocol Proxy is a viable alternative to tradi-
tional transports when heightened anonymity is required.
While there are a number of improvements that will in-
crease throughput, these preliminary results show it is
possible to tunnel a TCP session through a UDP protocol
and maintain TCP’s guaranteed delivery. Observation-
based FTE extends this and ensures the traffic will not
be detected by rule-based analysis or DPI. Furthermore,
a deterministic HMM ensures the Protocol Proxy accu-
rately models interpacket timing and avoids detection by
side-channel analysis. Finally, the choice of a protected
static protocol ensures stateful protocol analysis is useless
while raising the collateral damage associated with false
positives.
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